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WHEN WORKERS SAY "NO" TO DRUG
TESTING: ISSUES IN THE PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE SECTORS
INTRODUCTION
On September 5, 1989, in a nationally televised speech, President
George Bush announced several policies designed to combat the sale
and use of illegal drugs in the United States.1 In his address, President
Bush demanded that employers eliminate drugs from the workplace.2
Many employers have already begun to screen current or potential em-
ployees for drug use.3
Employers who institute drug testing programs may encounter a va-
riety of legal and practical problems. This article will analyze the legal
issues surrounding an employer's decision to initiate such programs by
comparing issues raised in current decisions on testing of public em-
ployees with the concerns affecting private employers.
I. PUBLIC EMPLOYERS - LEGAL ISSUES
A. Search and Seizure
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution protects
citizens from unreasonable governmental searches and seizures.4
1. N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1989, at Al, col. 6.
2. Id. at B7, col. 6.
3. As of 1986, approximately 25 percent of Fortune 500 companies drug tested em-
ployees. Note, Employee Drug Testing - Issues Facing Private Sector Employers, 65
N.C.L. REv. 832, 839 (1987). By the following year, almost half of all Fortune 500
companies had instituted or considered instituting testing procedures for drug and alco-
hol abuse. Note, Drug Testing of Public and Private Employees in Alaska, 5 ALASKA L.
REV. 133, 133 (1988).
4. The fourth amendment provides, in pertinent part: "The right of the people to be
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Courts have held that urinalysis, breathalyzer tests and blood tests con-
stitute searches under the fourth amendment.' In determining the rea-
sonableness of a search, courts balance the nature and quality of the
intrusion upon the employee's fourth amendment interest against the
importance of the governmental interest asserted as justification for the
search.6 In drug testing situations, courts weigh employee privacy in-
terests7 against governmental interests in effective operation of the
workplace.8
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated.... ." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See O'Connor v. Ortega,
480 U.S. 709 (1987) (searches by government employers are subject to constitutional
restraints).
5. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989) (urinal-
ysis of railroad employees pursuant to federal regulation constituted governmental
search); National Federation of Federal Employees v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935, 942
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (compulsory urinalysis of public employees constitutes a seizure
whether or not act of urination is observed); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987)
(chemical analysis of urine samples as invasion of privacy interest); California v.
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) (breathalyzer test as search); Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (blood test as search).
Prior to Skinner, the Southern District of New York in Fowler v. New York City
Department of Sanitation, 704 F. Supp. 1264 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), held that a urine test of a
job applicant was not a search because the prospective employee was fully aware that a
test would take place and, therefore, had no expectation of privacy. Cf. City of Palm
Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322, 1324 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (consent procured
under threat of disciplinary action held invalid).
6. Weinberger, 818 F.2d at 942.
7. Among these interests, courts have enumerated freedom from giving involuntary
samples and privacy in the act of urination. Fowler, 704 F. Supp. at 1269. For further
discussion of the scope of public employee privacy interests, see infra notes 26-37 and
accompanying text.
8. Public employers' interests are arguably magnified in light of Exec. Order No.
12,564, 3 C.F.R. 224 (1987) (reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7307). The order provides in perti-
nent part:
The Federal government, as the largest employer in the Nation, can and should
show the way towards achieving drug-free workplaces through a program designed
to offer drug users a helping hand and, at the same time, demonstrating to drug
users and potential drug users that drugs will not be tolerated in the Federal work-
place...
Section 1. Drug-Free Workplace
(a) Federal employees are required to refrain from the use of illegal drugs.
(b) The use of illegal drugs by Federal employees, whether on duty or off duty, is
contrary to the efficiency of the service.
(c) Persons who use illegal drugs are not suitable for Federal employment. ...
Section 3. Drug Testing Programs
(a) The head of each Executive agency shall establish a program test for the use
of illegal drugs by employees in sensitive positions ....
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In rejecting the fourth amendment claims of government employees,
some courts have held that certain employees, because of the nature of
their jobs, have a diminished expectation of privacy.9 Further, it is
uncertain whether a person has an expectation of privacy with respect
to illegal activity such as the use of illegal drugs. 10 Yet urinalysis can
reveal information in which an individual has a reasonable expectation
of privacy. For example, a urine specimen may reveal that an em-
ployee is pregnant or undergoing treatment for diabetes, epilepsy,
schizophrenia or heart problems.'
Until March, 1989, the constitutionality of random drug testing was
(c) [T]he head of each Executive agency is authorized to test an employee for
illegal drug use under the following circumstances:
(1) When there is a reasonable suspicion that any employee uses illegal drugs;
(2) In an examination authorized by the agency regarding an accident or unsafe
practice ....
(d) The head of each Executive agency is authorized to test any applicant for
illegal drug use.
President Reagan's order prompted local government entities to institute drug testing
programs. See Policemen's Benevolent Association of New Jersey v. Township of
Washington, 850 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1988). For further analysis of the case, see Com-
ment, Applying the Fourth Amendment to Random Drug Testing of Police Officers, 36
WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 263-1989).
In addition to Reagan's Executive Order, 41 U.S.C.A. § 701 (West 1987 & Supp.
1990) requires that government contractors and grant recipients be drug-free. It em-
phasizes awareness programs and rehabilitation assistance.
9. See, eg., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384,
1393 (1989) (customs service employees); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507
(D.N.J. 1986) (fire fighters). Courts have also held that private employees in heavily
regulated industries have a diminished expectation of privacy. See, eg., Shoemaker v.
Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986) (horse racing jock-
eys); Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988) (nuclear
power plant employees).
10. Cf. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (governmental conduct that
can reveal whether a substance is cocaine, and no other arguably "private" fact, does
not intrude on a legitimate privacy interest); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983)
(tests or searches designed only to reveal the presence or absence of contraband do not
intrude upon a reasonable expectation of privacy). It is not necessarily the case that
"private possession" of an article which cannot be sold in commerce is itself illegal. See
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123 n.23; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (obscenity);
Raven v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975) (marijuana in the home).
11. Miller, Mandatory Urinalysis Testing and the Privacy Rights of Subject Employ-
ees: Toward a General Rule of Legality Under the Fourth Amendment, 48 U. Prrr.
L.REv. 201, 206 (1986). But see Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 653 F. Supp.
1510, 1528 (D. Neb. 1987), aff'd, 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988) (no ninth amendment
privacy violation in collecting medical information absent the likelihood of unauthor-
ized disclosure).
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an issue that divided the federal courts.12 However, in National Treas-
ury Employees Union v. Von Raab 3 and Skinner v. Railway Labor
Exec. Ass'n 14 the Supreme Court allowed drug testing of individuals in
certain critical jobs without requiring the employer to suspect that the
worker had been using drugs.15
B. Equal Protection
Public sector employees challenging drug testing schemes have
brought equal protection claims against their employers. In Poole v.
Stephens, 6 for example, corrections officers, corrections officer recruits
and a labor union brought a civil rights action against a state correc-
tions department.17 They maintained that random testing of recruits,
while officers were tested only upon individualized suspicion, as well as
12. For opinions requiring individualized suspicion prior to testing, see Lovvorn v.
City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539, vacated, 861 F.2d 1388 (6th Cir. 1988) (fire fight-
ers); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986); Taylor v. O'Grady,
669 F. Supp. 1422 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (correctional officers); Amalgamated Transit Union
v. Sunline Transit Agency, 663 F. Supp. 1560 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (mass transit employ-
ees); Bostic v. McClendon, 650 F. Supp. 245 (N.D. Ga. 1986). For cases upholding
testing absent individualized suspicion, see Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n of New Jersey
v. Township of Washington, 850 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1988) (policemen); Jones v. McKen-
zie, 833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (transportation employees of school district); Mc-
Donnell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987) (correctional officers); Shoemaker v.
Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986) (horse jockeys).
When an incident occurs that brings an employee to the attention of management
regarding drug use, courts generally uphold an employer's right to test its employees.
See Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 802
F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1986) (testing after incident possibly resulting from employee er-
ror); Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976) (testing after accident); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F.
Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (testing employees found smoking marijuana).
13. 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
14. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
15. In Von Raab, the Court allowed the government employer to test customs em-
ployees involved in drug interdiction. The court reasoned that the employer's interest
in random drug testing is enhanced because employees in customs are vital to the war
on drugs in the United States, so the public interest demands that they be drug-free.
109 S. Ct. at 1397-98. The Von Raab and Skinner opinions allowed random testing of
employees in positions that implicate safety concerns such as carrying guns, Von Raab,
109 S. Ct. at 1397, or working on railways, Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1420. In Von Raab,
the Court vacated the determination of the Seventh Circuit that employees handling
"classified" materials could be subjected to random drug testing. 109 S. Ct. at 1396-97.
16. 688 F. Supp. 149 (D.N.J. 1988).
17. Id. at 150.
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the department's failure to test other categories of employees, 8 de-
prived them of equal protection under the law. 9 Rejecting these
claims, the District Court for the District of New Jersey found a ra-
tional basis for the differing schemes.2° The court therefore held that
the testing scheme did not violate the plaintiffs' right to equal
protection.21
In Shoemaker v. Handel,22 differential testing of various categories
of employees led a horse racing jockey to bring an equal protection
action against the New Jersey Racing Commission.23 The Third Cir-
cuit determined that because jockeys are the most visible participants
in horse racing, a jockey's drug abuse could more seriously undermine
the integrity of the sport than could abuse by trainers, grooms and
officials who were not subject to random testing.24 Hence, the court
found that random testing of jockeys alone was a rational step towards
eradicating drug abuse in the horse racing industry.25
C. Right of Privacy
Employees challenging drug testing schemes have asserted that test-
ing programs intrude upon a constitutional right of privacy distinct
from the privacy factor balanced in search and seizure claims. 26 The
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, in National Treas-
ury Employees Union v. Von Raab,27 found that drug testing of cus-
18. The department declined to test certain "civilian" employees although they had
regular contact with the inmates. Id. at 156.
19. Id.
20. The court found that recruits were involved in different activities than officers,
such as learning to fire weapons. This factor coupled with the intensity of the recruits'
training program lent a rational basis to the Department's decision. As to the civilian
employees, the court held that the Department could permissibly battle drugs one step
at a time. Id. at 156-57.
21. Id.
22. 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986).
23. Id. at 1137. Because the racing industry conducted the test pursuant to admin-
istrative regulations promulgated by the Commission, the court applied constitutional
analysis to the claims. Id. at 1141.
24. Id. at 1144.
25. Id. The court cited Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955), as support
for step-by-step reform. 795 F.2d at 1144.
26. For discussion of employees' privacy rights in light of fourth amendment
claims, see supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
27. 649 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. La. 1986), vacated, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd
in part, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
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toms workers who sought promotion into certain positions
unconstitutionally interfered with employees' "penumbral right of pri-
vacy."' 8 The court found that the urinalysis offended the dignity of the
workers.29 The court noted that "excreting bodily wastes" 30 is a func-
tion accompanied by "a legitimate expectation of privacy in both the
process and the product."31
Other courts have refused to sustain constitutional privacy claims,
citing a countervailing state interests that outweigh employees' rights.
In Smith v. White,32 employees of the Tennessee Valley Authority
brought an action seeking damages for alleged violation of their consti-
tutional rights as a consequence of drug urinalysis.3 3 The Eastern Dis-
trict of Tennessee found that because investigations ensured that other
persons were unaware that plaintiffs were targets of investigation, the
Tennessee Valley Authority protected the employees' privacy rights.3 4
Further, the court noted its uncertainty as to whether a non-consensual
urinalysis is an infringement of constitutional privacy guarantees.3 5 Fi-
28. 649 F. Supp. at 389. The Court cited Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), both reproductive rights cases, in support
of the existence of rights or zones of privacy emanating from more explicit constitu-
tional guarantees. 649 F. Supp. at 389.
29. 649 F. Supp. at 389. Standing behind partitions, officials observed workers from
the shoulders up as employees produced urine samples. Id. at 382.
30. Id. at 389.
31. Id. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit vacated the lower court's judgment. 816 F.2d
170 (5th Cir. 1987). The Union, in its appeal, did not seek to support its injunction
based upon penumbral rights to privacy. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit expressed no
opinion on the issue save to note, that such rights are "limited by countervailing state
interests." 816 F.2d at 181. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court which
approved testing of certain employees. 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
32. 666 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Tenn. 1987), aff'd, 857 F.2d 1475 (6th Cir. 1988).
33. Id. at 1086. The testing was part of an investigation which began when a Ten-
nessee Valley Authority (TVA) public safety officer began treatment for drug abuse.
When personnel of the TVA's Office of the Inspector General (0IG) questioned the
public safety officer, he provided the investigators with information about drug usage
and distribution at the power plant where he was employed. This information ulti-
mately led to the TVA's testing of the plaintiffs. Id. at 1086-87.
OIG officers questioned the plaintiffs, then requested samples. Employees who re-
fused to give samples received a memorandum from the OIG. The memorandum stated
that a failure to consent to the sample or a positive result could lead to adverse adminis-
trative action. The memo also enumerated confidentiality guarantees. OIG investiga-
tors observed all but one of the employees as the workers produced the samples. Id. at
1087-88.
34. Id. at 1090.
35. Id. The court assumed that plaintiff asserted a "penumbral personal privacy
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol38/iss1/15
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nally, the court concluded that the government's need to secure a drug-
free workplace outweighed any privacy rights the workers had.3 6
D. Self-Incrimination
Employees alleging a violation of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion in drug testing schemes generally assert a two-fold violation of
their fifth amendment rights. They contend that an employer's taking
and analysis of urine samples constitutes one infringement, and that an
employer's demand for medical information on consent forms also vio-
lates their privilege against self-incrimination.37 Courts have con-
cluded that chemical analysis results are not the evidence of a
"testimonial or communicative nature"3" that the fifth amendment re-
quires in order to trigger the privilege.3 9 With regard to the consent
forms, the court in Rushton v. Nebraska Public Power District' held
that evidence of the use of licit medication gleaned from the consent
forms does not compel employees to be witnesses against themselves.4 '
right" recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (privacy interest in
contraception).
36. 666 F. Supp. at 1090. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Smith in a brief disposition.
857 F.2d 1475 (6th Cir. 1988).
See also Amalgamated Tran. Union v. Sunline Tran. Agcy., 663 F. Supp. 1560, 1571-
72 (C.D. Cal. 1987). The Central District of California found no privacy interest that
rose to an independent fundamental right, concluding that employees had vindicated
their interest with their other constitutional claims of search and seizure, procedural
due process and self-incrimination. Id. at 1572.
37. See Amalgamated, 663 F. Supp. at 1570-71; Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power
Dist., 653 F. Supp. 1510, 1528 (D. Neb. 1987), aff'd, 944 F.2d 572 (8th Cir. 1988).
38. Rushton, 653 F. Supp. at 1528.
39. Id.; Amalgamated, 663 F. Supp. at 1570-71. Both courts relied on Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), in which the Supreme Court held that blood tests and
analysis thereof did not constitute evidence of a testimonial nature that compelled an
accused to testify against himself. 384 U.S. at 757.
40. 653 F. Supp. 1510 (D. Neb. 1987), aff'd, 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988).
41. Id. at 1528. In Amalgamated, the court found that even if an employee admit-
ted drug use, the employee would not be subject to criminal sanction under the program
at issue. Thus, even though employees received warning that use of a controlled sub-
stance could result in discharge, sanctions short of criminal prosecution did not impli-
cate the self-incrimination clause. 663 F. Supp. at 1571.
The district court in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp.
380 (E.D. La. 1986), vacated, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part, 109 S. Ct. 1384
(1989), held that urine samples and pre-test forms constitute testimonial evidence. 649
F. Supp. at 388. Distinguishing Schmerber, the district court found that because ob-
servers listened to employees producing samples, the procedure was a shocking invasion
of privacy. Id. These conclusions led the court to find a violation of the fifth amend-
1990]
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E. Due Process
Another argument that the district court noted in Rushton was dep-
rivation of substantive due process. 42 This claim alleged arbitrary and
capricious deprivation of liberty.43 Based on evidence presented, the
district court found that the testing program was not so susceptible to
error as to violate the due process clause."
In Everett v. Napper,45 the Eleventh Circuit rejected plaintiff's sub-
stantive due process claims. In Everett, a drug dealer implicated a fire
fighter as a drug user.46 As a result of the dealer's statement, Everett's
employer ordered him to submit to urinalysis.4 7 Everett's refusal to
cooperate with the investigation resulted in his suspension.48 In re-
jecting Everett's claim, the court determined that the employer's re-
quirement was rationally related to the city's strong and legitimate
interest in public safety.49 The court further held that a rational basis
ment. The Fifth Circuit rejected this conclusion in holding that measurement of physi-
cal characteristics, like contents of urine samples, did not implicate the fifth
amendment. 816 F.2d at 181.
42. 653 F. Supp. at 1525.
43. Id.
44. Id. The power plant used an EMIT procedure in conjunction with other confir-
matory tests. Id. The Enzyme Multiplied Immunoassay Technique (EMIT) is the most
widely used test for evidence of past substance usage. ZEESE, DRUG TESTING LEGAL
MANUAL § 2.02[1][a] at 2-7 (1988). The drug, as it metabolizes in the urine, combines
with antibodies to form complexes. Ordinary lab methods can detect these complexes.
On the accuracy of particular tests, see Note, Employee Drug Testing - Issues Facing
Private Sector Employers, 65 N.C.L. Rev. 832, 838 (1987); Comment, Your Urine or
Your Job. Is Private Employer Drug Urinalysis Constitutional in California?, 19 Loy.
L.A.L. REv. 1451, 1456-61 (1986); Note, Private Sector Drug Testing: Availability of
State Statutory Remedies for Aggrieved Employees, 21 SUFF. U.L. REv. 1054, 1073-79
(1987); Stem & Weeks, Substance Testing and Workers' Rights: Litigation & Collective
Bargaining Strategies to Protect the Private-Sector Employees, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 863,
870-76 (1988).
See also McDonnell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1309 (8th Cir. 1987), mandating that
equipment and proceedings must conform to the standard of Spence v. Farrier, 807
F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1986), which held that EMIT tests are reliable enough to satisfy the
requirements of due process. Id. at 756.
45. 833 F.2d 1507 (11th Cir. 1987).
46. Id. at 1509.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1513.
49. Id. The Court applied the test of Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976), re-
quiring a court to "look to whether the requirement imposed is rationally related to the
legitimate interests of the employer." 833 F.2d at 1513. Kelley upheld a hair-grooming
regulation for police officers over due process claims. Additionally, the court noted that
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol38/iss1/15
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for testing those suspected of drug use existed such that the urinalysis
requirement was neither arbitrary nor capricious in violation of due
process.
5 0
II. PRIVATE EMPLOYERS - LEGAL ISSUES
A. Constitutional provisions
Privacy interests that plaintiffs have asserted in private sector drug-
testing cases differ from claims by public employees. Most signifi-
cantly, fourth amendment claims are unavailable in the private sector
as courts have historically applied these claims solely to governmental
institutions.51 Similarly, state constitutional right of privacy provisions
are applied to state actors.5 2 Recently, however, a California appellate
court considered whether private employers, without violating the
state's constitutional privacy provision,5 3 can require job applicants to
a substantive due process violation requires an egregious violation of decency and fair-
ness. Id. The court cited Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), in which the
Supreme Court found that compelling an individual to vomit two capsules by forcing an
emetic into his stomach violated the individual's due process rights. Id.
50. 833 F.2d at 1513. This article's scope regarding due process violations of public
employees focuses on substantive due process. However, several courts have found vio-
lations of procedural due process in drug testing of public employees. See, ag., Frater-
nal Order of Police Lodge No. 5 v. Tucker, 868 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1989) (merely advising
police officers of complaint involving their drug use without presenting specific allega-
tions or evidence or affording plaintiffs an opportunity to explain or rebut evidence
violated policemen's due process right); Murphy v. McClendon, 712 F. Supp. 921 (N.D.
Ga. 1988) (city board violated public employee's procedural due process rights when
city gave only general, conclusory reasons for discharge); Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d
1507 (11 th Cir. 1987) (firefighter who had benefit of counsel and opportunity to present
evidence and cross-examine witnesses not deprived of due process).
51. See, eg., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (fruits of search, which
would violate fourth amendment if conducted by government, are admissible if seized
by private citizen); Texas Employment Comm'n v. Hughes Drilling Fluids, 746 S.W.2d
796 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (rejected private sector workers' fourth amendment claim).
52. See, e.g., Greco v. Halliburton Co., 674 F. Supp. 1447 (D. Wyo. 1987) (physical
examination from Department of Transportation does not make private employer state
actor); Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989) (constitutional
right to privacy does not extend to private party actions).
53. Wilkinson v. Times-Mirror Books, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1034, 264 Cal. Rptr. 194
(1989). California's state constitution provides that: "All people are by nature free and
independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life
and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining
safety, happiness and privacy." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
In Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839
(1976), a suit against a private school for unauthorized disclosure of a transcript, a
California court stated that the right of privacy "is protected not merely against state
1990]
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submit to urine tests as a condition of employment. In Wilkinson v.
Times Mirror Books,54 a publishing office declined to hire three appli-
cants who refused urinalysis. The California Court of Appeals upheld
the urinalysis testing.55 The court reasoned that the state constitu-
tional privacy provision applied to the private sector, but the testing
scheme did not unduly burden the applicants' privacy rights.56
B. Other actions
1. Other Privacy Claims
Private sector workers in most jurisdictions bring actions for tortious
invasion of privacy or breach of common law right of privacy. In
Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling,57 two former employees of a drill-
ing rig brought suit against their former employer challenging their
discharge following refusal to submit to urinalysis.58 After rejecting
action; it is considered an inalienable right which may not be violated by anyone." 64
Cal. App. 3d at 829, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 842. The court cited an election brochure argu-
ment referring to the provision as a restriction upon business as well as upon govern-
ment. Id. at 829 n.2, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 842 n.2.
54. 215 Cal. App. 3d 1034, 264 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1989).
55. Id. at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 196.
56. Id. at , 264 Cal. Rptr. at 203. The court reasoned that plaintiffs would expect
a physical exam to accompany their application for employment. Moreover, applicants
had the opportunity to choose testing or seeking other employment. The court also
noted that the testing procedures and means for disseminating test results provided safe-
guards to an applicant's privacy. Id. at _, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 204.
One commentator notes that plaintiffs have successfully invoked the state right to
privacy to halt testing at two California plants. McGovern, Employee Drug Testing
Legislation: Redrawing the Battlelines in the War on Drugs, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1453,
1466 (1987).
Additionally, plaintiff in Laws v. Calmat, 852 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1988), brought a
claim to enjoin drug testing under Article 1, § 1 of the California Constitution, but the
court held that federal labor law preempted the claim. Id. at 434. The court relied
upon absence of a published opinion applying the privacy right to drug testing. Id. at
434 n.5.
57. 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989).
58. Id. at 1125. The court considered Clarence Luedtke's and Paul Luedtke's sepa-
rate actions on appeal. Paul Luedtke, twice accused of violating the company's drug
and alcohol policies, submitted to a "comprehensive physical" without notice that the
company was screening his urine samples for drug use. He was suspended thereafter for
drug use. Paul's examination occurred two weeks prior to Nabors' announcement of its
drug testing policy. When the company requested that Paul submit two more urine
tests in order to return to work, he refused. Id. at 1125-26.
Clarence's complaint arose after the company's policy announcement. When Clar-
ence saw his name on a list of individuals to be tested, he declined "as a matter of
principle." At that point, the company fired Clarence. Id. at 1126.
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the employees' state constitutional privacy claims, 9 the Alaska
Supreme Court determined that in order for the former employees to
claim invasion of privacy, they had to show that the intrusion was un-
warranted or conducted in an unreasonable manner." The court
found that no cause of action for invasion of privacy arose because the
employees' refusal to submit to urinalysis prevented any intrusion from
occuring. In considering whether the company's taking and testing of
urine during a comprehensive physical was tortious, the court held that
the manner of testing was not unreasonable because the employee vol-
unteered the sample.61 Further, because the employer could test em-
ployees for drug use pursuant to an employment agreement, 62 the
intrusion was not unwarranted.63
A private employee may also base a claim on state statutes providing
a right to privacy. In Jackson v. Liquid Carbonic," a truck driver dis-
59. The Alaska Constitution confers a privacy right upon the state's citizens.
ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22. The Luedtke court declined to extend this privacy right to
the actions of private parties, distinguishing the Alaska provision from California's pro-
vision by the history surrounding voters' adoption of the California amendment. Id. at
1130. For discussion of the California provision and its history and application, see
supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
60. 768 P.2d at 1137.
61. The court held that because the employee continued to work with actual notice
of the screening, he thereby consented to urinalysis. His consent precluded a violation
of his common-law right of privacy. Id. at 1135. Cf City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475
So. 2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (signature of public employee on consent form
procured under threat of disciplinary action did not constitute consent to procedure).
62. 768 P.2d at 1137-38. See also Texas Employment Commission v. Hughes Drill-
ing Fluids, 746 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988). In Hughes Drilling, a private em-
ployer discharged a worker for his refusal to submit a urine sample for drug screening
purposes. For analysis of the employment contract issues in Luedtke, see infra notes
101-05 and accompanying text.
63. 768 P.2d at 1138. The court also held that Paul's lack of awareness of the
nature of the tests upon his urine did not render the analysis an invasion of privacy
because Paul knew that the test results would reach Nabors. Id.
The Luedtke opinion noted that, historically, invasion of privacy arose from publica-
tion of private facts. In Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 617 F. Supp. 1359
(D.S.C. 1985), the court noted that under applicable law, plaintiffs claiming libelous
invasion of privacy must prove either publicity of private facts or an outrageous intru-
sion into private activities. The court found that the employer's practice of drug testing
as part of an annual physical met neither standard. Id. at 1369-70. See also DiTomaso
v. Electronic Data Systems, No. 87-CV-60320AA (E.D. Mich. October 7, 1988) (1988
WL 156317) (urinalysis test violated none of four possible bases for a cause of action
under applicable law).
64. 863 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1988).
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missed after failing a mandatory drug test 65 brought an action under
the Massachusetts right of privacy statute.66 Proscribing only unrea-
sonable invasions of privacy, the statute created a balancing test where
the court could weigh the employer's legitimate business interest in ob-
taining information against the substantiality of the privacy infringe-
ment resulting from the disclosure of test results.67 The court held that
the state created no additional privacy right independent of the parties'
collective bargaining agreement.68
2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Workers challenging drug testing schemes have also sued employers
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Aggrieved employees
allege emotional harm resulting from both the manner of testing and
post-test disciplinary measures.69
In Kelley v. Schlumberger Technology Corporation,70 a successful
plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress arose from
the establishment, implementation and administration of an employer's
drug testing plan.71 Plaintiff complained of the company's practice of
65. Liquid Carbonic traditionally required biennial medical examinations in compli-
ance with federal safety regulations. These examinations included urinalysis to screen
for diabetes. In March 1985, the company announced that it would thereafter screen
urine samples for drugs and alcohol. Liquid Carbonic distributed consent forms, notify-
ing drivers that testing was a condition of continued employment. The company fired
Jackson in February 1986 when traces of marijuana appeared in his sample. 863 F.2d at
112-13.
66. The statute provides in part: "A person shall have a right against unreasonable,
substantial or serious interference with his privacy .... " MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 214,
§ 1B (Law. Co-op 1986).
67. 863 F.2d at 118. Compare this analysis with reasoning in fourth amendment
claims discussed supra notes 4-15 and accompanying text.
68. 863 F.2d at 117. The court found that because plaintiff's claims were dependent
on the agreement, federal labor law preempted the claims. Id. at 120.
69. For further analysis of this tort claim in drug testing scenarios, see H~bert, Pri-
vate Sector Drug Testing: Employer Rights, Risks, and Responsibilities, 36 U. KAN. L.
REv. 823, 843-45 (1988).
70. 849 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1988).
71. Id. at 42. Plaintiff challenged his discharge following a positive drug test.
Plaintiff alleged a variety of torts and constitutional violations. At the trial level, the
court directed a verdict for defendant company on a claim of wrongful discharge.
Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and
defamation. Plaintiffwon damages at trial for tortious invasion of privacy and negligent
infliction of emotional distress. Id.
The jury also found that Schiumberger violated plaintiff's right to privacy under the
Louisiana Constitution. Id. The appellate opinion contained no analysis of state action
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observing employees provide urine samples.72 The trial court in-
structed the jury to find for plaintiff if the defendant's conduct
foreseeably caused the plaintiff serious emotional distress and if a rea-
sonable person in the plaintiff's position would have been seriously dis-
tressed.73 The First Circuit affirmed a jury verdict for Kelley finding
that the instructions on foreseeability applied Louisiana law
correctly.74
Kelley demonstrates the extent to which private employees' claims
are grounded in state law. Additionally, evidence that Kelly's drug use
and injury declined two years after dismissal and after institution of the
urinalysis program was irrelevant to the reasonableness of the test pol-
icy at the time of Kelley's discharge. 75 This holding will drastically




Dissemination of an employee's positive drug test results beyond
those who are privileged to know the results may lead an employee to
sue for defamation.77 In Houston Belt & Terminal Railing Co. v.
Wherry,78 the railroad tested Wherry after he sustained an injury and
issues. For discussion of state constitutional privacy provisions as applied to private
actors, see supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
72. 849 F.2d at 43.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 44. The First Circuit also found that the employer had failed to preserve
the issue of the instruction's adequacy by neglecting to object. Id. For a decision con-
trary to Kelley, see Satterfield v. Lockheed Missile & Space Co., 617 F. Supp. 1359
(D.S.C. 1985). In Satterfield, plaintiff brought an action alleging infliction of emotional
harm after losing his job following a positive result on an involuntary urine test. Id. at
1365. In ruling against plaintiff, the court held that the employer's conduct was neither
"extreme" nor "outrageous." Id. at 1366. The court appeared to rely on the fact that
the company approached the employee privately, expressed reluctance at having to ter-
minate the employee and informed the employee that he could fight the termination
decision. H~bert, supra note 69, at 843. Additionally, the company allowed the em-
ployee's work record to reflect a voluntary dismissal and offered the employee favorable
references. Id.
75. 849 F.2d at 45.
76. For further discussion of the business sense of drug testing, see infra note 200
and accompanying text.
77. See H~bert, supra note 69, at 841.
78. 548 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 434
U.S. 962 (1977).
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subsequently fainted.79 The test results revealed a trace of metha-
done.Y° After receipt of the results, the superintendent forwarded a
report of the results and doctor's recommendations to several company
officers."1 Pending an investigation, Wherry arranged for another
urine test, which revealed no methadone or other illicit drugs.82 Even
though Wherry testified that he had never used narcotics, the company
dismissed him for being an "unsafe employee" and for failing to report
his accident in a timely fashion. 3 After Wherry's discharge, the
United States Department of Labor inquired into his dismissal.8 4 The
employer sent the Department a letter indicating that traces of metha-
done appeared in Wherry's urine.85
In his action, Wherry claimed that the original doctor's report, the
superintendent's report and the letter to the Department of Labor were
defamatory. 6 Although the Texas Appeals Court found that the su-
perintendent's report and the letter to the Department of Labor were
defamatory, 7 the doctor's statement was not defamatory because the
doctor intended to convey only a possibility that Wherry used drugs.88
The statements concerning methadone were false based upon Wherry's
testimony and a negative result on the later test. 9 Necessary publica-
tion of the defamatory statements occurred when company officials re-
ceived superintendent's report and when the company sent the letter to
79. 548 S.W.2d at 746. The testing was done to determine if the fainting resulted
from diabetes or drug use. Id.
80. Id. The doctor performing the test informed the railroad that methadone was
commonly used to treat heroin addicts. The doctor also told the railroad's safety super-
intendent that it was uncertain if the presence of methadone signified drug use. How-
ever, methadone's presence might warrant further investigation. Id.
81. Id. at 746. The superintendent sent the communications pursuant to normal
company reporting procedures. Id. See also H-I6bert, supra note 69, at 841.
82. 548 S.W.2d at 746. See also H1ibert, supra note 69, at 841.
83. 548 S.W.2d at 746-47. The court indicates that the time which elapsed between
Wherry's mishap and his report thereof was actually quite short. The opinion also indi-
cated that the railroad did not dismiss Wherry for a violation of company rules prohib-
iting drug use. Id. at 747.
84. Id. Inquiry occurred because Wherry sought assistance from the Veteran's Ad-
ministration. Id.
85. Id. See also H6bert, supra note 69, at 841-42.
86. Hfbert, supra note 69, at 842.
87. 548 S.W.2d at 748-49. See also Hibert, supra note 69, at 842.
88. 548 S.W.2d at 746.
89. Id. at 750.
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the Department of Labor.'
Similarly, in Strachan v. Union Oil Co., an employer suspended
two employees because of a suspicion of drug use. The employer rein-
stated them only after negative drug tests.92 Addressing plaintiff's def-
amation claims, the Fifth Circuit noted that to hold an employer guilty
of defamation for merely inquiring about drug use would hamper in-
vestigation of possible disciplinary, mental or physical problems of
workers.9 3 One commentator cites Strachan for the proposition that
while reasonable internal dissemination of investigation and urinalysis
results should not lead to defamation liability, communication of such
information should be as limited as possible.94
4. Employment Contract Issues
Public employees fighting drug testing schemes often allege a depri-
vation of property interest in employment.95 In contrast, private em-
ployees usually face the employee-at-will doctrine which greatly
restricts actions for wrongful discharge. 96 Employees bringing such
actions usually seek relief under two modifications to the doctrine:
public policy exceptions and implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.
In Greco v. Halliburton Co.97 plaintiff brought an action against his
employer alleging wrongful discharge and breach of an implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing in his contract.9" The District
90. Id. at 754.
91. 768 F.2d 703 (5th Cir. 1985).
92. Id. at 704. See Hbert, supra note 69, at 842.
93. 768 F.2d at 706. The court emphasized that the company in no way tried to
cast the workers in an-Wfavorable light. Further, the opinion noted that Strachan was
not charged with drug use; he was merely told that the company had "a possible suspi-
cion of drug use." Finally, the court described the unusual behavior of plaintiff Gas-
pard as support for a finding of no malice on the part of the company. Id. at 706.
94. H6bert, supra note 69, at 843.
95. For analysis of this type of action, see supra nbte 51 discussing procedural due
process claims.
96. See H6bert, supra note 69, at 845. The commentator notes that in states which
have abrogated the doctrine, wrongful discharge issues resemble issues in labor arbitra-
tion cases. Id. For discussion of labor arbitration cases on drug testing, see infra notes
158-86 and accompanying text.
97. 674 F. Supp. 1447 (D. Wyo. 1987).
98. Id. at 1448. The employer fired Greco for refusing to submit to a drug test. Id.
at 1449.
1990]
Washington University Open Scholarship
352 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 38:337
Court for the District of Wyoming determined that a "contraband pol-
icy" requiring employees to submit to random urinalysis formed part
of plaintiff's at-will employment contract upon signing a copy of its
terms.99 Furthermore, the court noted that even if a good faith or fair
dealing covenant was implied in the parties' contract, plaintiff failed to
show that Halliburton dismissed plaintiff in bad faith.1°°
Good faith and fair dealing exceptions also formed the basis of at-
will workers' claims in Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling.1 °1 However,
a discussion of the public policy exception theory controlled the court's
analysis. According to the Alaska Supreme Court, a public policy ex-
ists in protecting a worker's right to withhold certain private facts from
his employer." °2 A public policy of paramount importance to these
rights was support for the health and safety of workers at the rig. O
The Luedtke court, although recognizing an employer's testing pre-
rogative, imposed certain guidelines upon testing. The court mandated
that the drug test occur at a time reasonably contemporaneous with the
employee's work time. The employer's interest, the court held, is lim-
ited to the quality of employees' work and does not warrant the com-
pany assuming the role of a police officer."~ The opinion also required
notice of testing procedures for employees so that workers could con-
99. Id. at 1449. The court noted that the contraband policy did not give plaintiff
tenure in his position or change his at-will status because it did not create procedures
for discipline or discharge or destroy Halliburton's plenary discretion to discharge em-
ployees. Id. at 1450.
100. Id. at 1450.
101. 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989).
102. Id. at 1131-32. The court based this holding on a number of Alaska law
sources. Among these sources were statutes protecting workers from polygraph tests as
a condition of employment and from management inquiry into certain subjects. Addi-
tionally, the court noted the state constitutional privacy clause and an Alaska citizen's
common law right to privacy. Id. at 1132-33.
For further discussion of the state's constitutional privacy provision, see supra note
59 and accompanying text. For consideration of common law rights to privacy as ana-
lyzed in tort cases, see supra notes 56-68 and accompanying text.
103. Id. at 1136. Employing a balancing test, the court applied the reasoning of
federal courts on fourth amendment issues. For discussion of search and seizure cases
balancing employee privacy with company safety interests, see supra notes 4-15 and
accompanying text. For analysis of the significance of the balancing test in comparing
public and private sector testing schemes, see infra notes 205-07 and accompanying
text.
104. 768 P.2d at 1136. Compare this concept to President George Bush's request
for companies to halt employee drug use as a means of affecting a generalized "war on
drugs." See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
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test the additional term of employment." 5
In Jennings v. Minco Technology Labs" plaintiff faced dismissal if
she did not accept a testing policy as new terms of employment.'0 7
Claiming a public policy exception, Jennings wished to continue in her
employment without assenting to the modification. The company,
however, objected to a contract without the testing scheme.10 8 The
court refused to grant plaintiff's request. Noting that Jennings con-
sented to the testing,"°9 the court refused to modify the at-will employ-
ment contract on the basis of a public policy exception for employee
privacy interests in freedom from drug testing."o
5. Handicap Discrimination
a. Federal Law
An employer who receives federal financial assistance is subject to
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The Act prohibits discrimination
against handicapped persons based solely on their handicap when such
105. 768 P.2d at 1137.
106. 765 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
107. Id. at 449.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 502. Plaintiff asserted that her consent was invalid because she con-
sented under threat of losing a job that she needed to support her family. In rejecting
this contention, the court found that agreeing with plaintiff's theory would create two
laws of contract, one for the wealthy and one for the poor. Id. But see City of Palm
Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) ("coerced consent" given
under threat of discipline held invalid).
110. 765 S.W.2d at 500-01. Plaintiff relied upon Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck,
687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985), which held that an employee could obtain money damages
from an employer who fired him solely because the employee refused to commit an
illegal act. Id. at 735. The Jennings court, in refusing to recognize a distinctive public
policy for privacy in drug testing cases, noted that the Sabine distinction was a narrow
one. 765 S.W.2d at 500-01. Further, the court believed that the at-will doctrine, with-
out modification, served a public policy by itself. Id. at 501. Besides the employee-at-
will doctrine, the issue of drug testing in the employee contract arena has also arisen
regarding unemployment benefits. In Texas Employment Comm'n v. Hughes Drilling
Fluids, 746 S.W.2d 796 (rex. Ct. App. 1988), the court determined that, given the
reasonableness of Hughes' drug testing policy due to safety interests, plaintiff's refusal
to provide a urine sample pursuant to the policy constituted "misconduct," disqualify-
ing the employee from obtaining unemployment benefits. Id. at 802-03. In reaching its
decision, the court rejected the Commission's theory that the policy was not part of
plaintiff's employment contract. Id. at 799. Additionally, the Commission failed with a
novel argument that plaintiff's refusal to submit a sample did not violate the policy
because the testing scheme required an employee's consent to collect urine. Id. at 800.
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persons are otherwise qualified for their duties.111 In defining handi-
capped person, the Act excludes an alcoholic or one who abuses drugs
and whose current alcohol or drug use prevents them from performing
their duties or causes their employment to constitute a direct threat to
the safety or property of others. 12
A court clarified this construction of the Act in Burka v. New York
City Transit Authority.113 Plaintiffs alleged that the Transit Authority
characterized them as "drug abusers" by virtue of their positive drug
test. Therefore, plaintiffs were "handicapped individuals" the em-
ployer could not discharge or reject unless the Authority demonstrated
that their performance or others' safety would be impaired.114 In re-
jecting plaintiffs' contentions, the court held that in light of the federal
government's efforts to eradicate drugs in the workplace, Congress
could not have allowed the Rehabilitation Act to be a "bulwark to
protect illegal drug users from 'discrimination' in employment." '1 15
The court emphasized that in 1978 Congress added statutory language
dealing with drug abusers as a response to employers' concerns that
they would be forced to hire drug abusers without regard to their quali-
fications if such persons were considered "handicapped." 1 6 Conse-
quently, the court held that only rehabilitated drug and alcohol abusers
fell within the definition of handicapped under the Act.117
111. 29 U.S.c. § 794 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
112. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (B) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See also American Federation
of Government Emp. v. Dole, 760 F. Supp. 445, 447 n.6 (D.D.C. 1987) (even if drug
user is considered handicapped, freedom from drug effects is proper standard governing
testing in critical jobs).
113. 680 F. Supp. 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
114. Id. at 596. Plaintiffs alleged that because the authority based its hiring and
firing decisions solely on the basis of drug test results, without to inquiring about job
qualifications, the authority violated the Rehabilitation Act. Id.
115. Id. at 597.
116. Id. at 598. Employers were concerned with the effects interpretations of vari-
ous administrative regulations finding that alcoholics and drug users were "handi-
capped individuals" could have on affirmative action programs. Id.
117. Id. The court's opinion noted that the 1978 amendment to the Act limited
application of the Act to the protection articulated in Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp.
791, 796 (E.D. Pa. 1978), which held that the Act's protection extended to users in the
process of rehabilitation. Plaintiffs interpreted the amendment as expanding the enact-
ment's protection. 680 F. Supp. at 598.
The Burka court also dismissed plaintiff's claim under 49 C.F.R. § 27.37(a) (1986),




More than forty of the fifty states and the District of Columbia have
handicap discrimination legislation."1 The legislation in many of the
states includes alcohol and drug addiction as conditions constituting
handicap.
In December, 1989, the Illinois Court of Appeals in Habinka v.
Human Rights Commission 119 determined that plaintiff failed to sus-
tain his burden of proof that his participation in a methadone program
constituted a handicapped condition under relevant state law.120 How-
ever, the court left open the possibility that other drug dependencies
could be cognizable handicaps. 21 A New York court reached a con-
trary conclusion in Doe v. Roe Ina 122 where it held that a job appli-
cant's status as an alleged drug addict made him a protected disabled
person under state law.123
III. STATE STATUTORY REGULATIONS
Seven states have enacted statutes specifically dealing with employee
ment investigations into the extent of a handicap. Based on its holding that narcotic use
is notperse a handicap, the court found the claim meritless. 680 F. Supp. at 601 n.20.
For additional analysis of handicap discrimination and federal law, see H6bert, supra
note 69, at 848-49.
118. For a comprehensive list of these enactments, see H6bert, supra note 69, at 849
n.171.
119. 192 Ill. App. 3d 343, 548 N.E.2d 702 (1989).
120. The court construed the Joint Rules of the Department of Human Rights and
the Human Rights Commission Section 2500.20. The relevant provisions provide that a
drug abuse condition is not a handicap unless the person can demonstrate that the con-
dition arises from a disease or functional disorder. Id. at -, 548 N.E.2d at 713. Addi-
tionally, the handicap must be unrelated to the person's ability to perform at work. Id.
121. Id. at -, 548 N.E.2d at 721.
122. 143 Misc. 2d 156, 539 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1989).
123. Id. at , 539 N.Y.S.2d at 879. Besides drug dependency, alcoholism may also
constitute a protected disability. For example, in Consolidated Freightways v. Cedar
Rapids Civil Rights Comm'n, 366 N.W.2d 522 (Iowa 1985), the Iowa Supreme Court
decided that accepted definitions of handicaps and disabilities included alcoholism, so
substance abuse fell within the purview of the statute. Id. at 527-28. The court found
sufficient evidence that the employee was an alcoholic and the employer violated the
employee's rights in refusing to allow the employee to return to work after receiving a
certification of good health from a treatment center. Id. at 530, 532. See also Clowes v.
Terminex Int'l Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 538 A.2d 794 (1988) (New Jersey law against dis-
crimination includes alcoholism as a handicap).
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drug testing.' 24 Many of the statutory guidelines resemble the princi-
ples guiding public employee testing.
Minnesota, for example, permits random drug testing only for work-
ers in "safety-sensitive" positions.125 Such a scheme resembles the
Supreme Court's standard in National Treasury Employees' Union v.
Von Raab,126 which allowed random testing only for customs officials
in certain critical positions.127 Vermont allows such testing only when
required by federal law.1 28 Of all the state enactments, Utah's is the
least restrictive, 29 placing few limits on testing rationales or circum-
stances."3° In contrast, Iowa, Montana and Rhode Island forbid ran-
dom testing. 131
Rhode Island considers privacy interests of employees by requiring
that workers provide testing samples in private.13 2 Moreover, all state
enactments provide procedures for ensuring the accuracy of results.1 33
124. These states are Iowa, Minnesota, Vermont, Connecticut, Utah, Rhode Island
and Montana.
125. MuL. STAT. ANN. § 181.951(4) (West 1988).
126. 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989). For further discussion of Von Raab, see supra note 15
and accompanying text.
127. 109 S. Ct. at 1397.
128. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 513(b) (1987). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 31-51x(b) (West 1987 & Supp. 1989) (prohibits random drug testing except in safety-
sensitive positions, if required under federal law or as a part of an employee-assistance
program). For further discussion, see Comment, Drug Testing Legislation: What are the
States Doing?, 36 U. KAN. L. REV. 919, 934-35 (1988). For analysis of the Vermont
enactment, see generally Field, Jar Wars in the Green Mountain State: Vermont's Drug
Use Testing Act Has the Potential to be the Best in the Nation, 13 VT. L. REV. 593
(1989).
129. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-38-1 to § -15 (1988). See Hibert, supra note 69, at
828.
130. The Code allows testing as a condition of employment, for investigation of
accidents or employee impairment and in order to maintain safety and productivity.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-38-7(2) (a)-(d) (1988). Random and pre-employment screening
is permissible. Id. § 34-38-7(3). See Hibert, supra note 69, at 828.
131. IOWA CODE ANN. § 730.5(2) (West 1979 & Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 39-2-304(l)(c) (1989); R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-6.5-1(A) (Michie Supp. 1988). Iowa al-
lows individualized testing only when the company has probable cause to declare an
employee impaired. Further, testing applies only to positions where the impairment
poses a safety threat or violates a company rule of which the worker is aware. IowA
CODE ANN. § 730.5(3). See H6bert, supra note 69, at 829-31.
132. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.5-1(b). See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-38-6(2);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51w(a). See H1bert, supra note 69, at 838.
133. Utah provides that employers must conduct testing in order to prevent sample
substitution. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-38-6(a). Safeguards against contamination must
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Several of the statutes also indicate proper uses for the results with
respect to disciplinary measures.' 34
IV. UNION AND ARBITRATION IssuEs
A. Railway Labor Act
Recently, the Supreme Court decided135 that disputes about the ad-
continue through storage and transportation and include careful labeling of the jars. Id.
at § 34-38-6(3)-(4). A confirmation test must verify a positive test. Id. at § 34-38-6(5).
Additionally, employers must allow workers the opportunity to provide medical infor-
mation relevant to the test. Id. at § 34-38-6(3)(d).
The Iowa enactment provides that lab analysis occur at a facility approved by the
state's health department. IOWA CODE ANN. § 730.5(3)(c). Testing must measure only
substances which affect job performance. Id. § 730.5(4). The Code requires confirma-
tion testing and the opportunity for an employee to explain a positive test. Id. at
§ 730.5(3)(d)-(e).
Montana requires a written policy providing for accurate collection of samples with
minimum intrusion on employee privacy. The law provides guidelines for storage, con-
firmatory testing and employee rebuttal. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304(2)-(3) (1989).
Minnesota has enacted similar provisions. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.952-53. Addi-
tionally, the Minnesota law requires the state health department to promulgate rules
safeguarding test reliability. Id. at § 181.953(1)(b). Connecticut provides for confirma-
tion testing'and for privacy of test results. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-flv,w(b).
Vermont requires a detailed written policy. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 514(2) (1987).
Employers may test only to detect drugs at non-therapeutic levels. Id. at § 514(1).
Chain-of-custody procedures are mandatory, along with the preservation of positive
samples for at least ninety days after the employee receives notification of the result. Id.
at § 514(5),(10). Confirmation testing is also mandatory. Id. at § 514(6)(A). The Ver-
mont Act also regulates laboratory selection and the dissemination of test results from
the labs. Id. at §§ 514(7)-(8), 518(a). Employees must have an opportunity to explain
the results and have an independent re-test. Id. at § 515.
Rhode Island provides for confirmation testing so the employee may order another
independent test at the employer's expense. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.5-1(D)-(E). Em-
ployees must also have an opportunity to explain test results. Id. at § 228-6.5-1(F).
For further analysis of statutory requirements, see Hbert, supra note 69, at 828-38.
134. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.953 10(b)(1) which forbids discharge based
on a single positive test result until the company gives the employee a chance to partici-
pate in counseling or rehabilitation. For more extensive analysis of drug testing laws in
the states, see generally Comment, supra note 130. See also H1bert, supra note 69, at
828-38. For in-depth analysis of state and local enactments both passed and proposed,
see generally McGovern, Employee Drug Testing Legislation: Redrawing the Battlelines
in the War on Drugs, 39 STAN. L. Rnv. 1453 (1987).
135. Consolidated Rail v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 2477, 2479 (1989).
The Court's holding agreed with Seventh and Eighth Circuit decisions. See Railway
Labor Executives Assn' v. Norfolk & Western R. Co., 833 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1987);
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. Burlington Northern R.C., 802 F.2d
1016 (8th Cir. 1986).
For purposes of the Act, a major dispute deals with the formation of contractual
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dition of a drug testing component to routine physicals are "minor dis-
putes" under the Railway Labor Act.136 Courts have found that the
controversy is a minor dispute if the disputed action is arguably justi-
fied by an existing labor agreement or if contentions that the contract
sanction the disputed action are not insubstantial or frivolous. 137
In Consolidated Rail v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 138 the Supreme
Court considered Conrail's past practices. 139 The employer had histor-
ically required physical exams that included urinalysis and had periodi-
cally performed drug screenings." 4 The Union asserted that while
past screenings were limited to circumstances in which the employer
had cause to believe workers were on drugs, the current program in-
cluded testing without cause.' 41 The Union also contended that the
new program regulated private, off-duty employee behavior. 42 The
Court found that while the Union's arguments could carry weight in an
arbitration setting, the Union could not convince the Court that Con-
rail's arguments were frivolous. 4 3 The absence of a challenge to Con-
rail's past practice supported a finding that Conrail retained a degree of
discretion with respect to testing.'" Further, the Court determined
that testing without particularized suspicion and the disciplinary con-
rights involving lengthy bargaining and mediation. 109 S. Ct. at 2480. In contrast,
minor disputes develop from the interpretation of existing rules. Id. Additionally, mi-
nor disputes do not require employers to maintain the status quo pending resolution of
other disagreements. Id. at 2481.
One district court, prior to the Consolidated Rail decision, found that had it been
called upon to reach the issue, it would have found the dispute to be major. Railway
Labor Execs. Assoc. v. Long Island Railroad Co., 651 F. Supp. 1284, 1285 (E.D.N.Y.
1987). For extensive analysis of the Burlington Northern and Long Island cases, see
Hbert, supra note 69, at 853-55.
136. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1982). The Act applies to carriers engaged in interstate
commerce. Id. at § 151.
137. 109 S. Ct. at 2482. The union in Consolidated Rail asserted that the dispute
was a "hybrid dispute" because it involved a change in working conditions made in
accordance with a contractual right to make such a change. Id. at 2488. The Court
refused to recognize a third category of dispute. Id. at 2484.
138. 109 S. Ct. 2477 (1989).
139. Id. at 2485.
140. Id. at 2485-86.
141. Id. at 2487.
142. Id. at 2488. The union also disputed certain provisions which could result in
employee discharge instead of suspension for drug problems. In effect, the union as-
serted that the employer's motive was disciplinary, not safety-related. Id. at 2489.
143. Id. at 2488-89.
144. Id. at 2488.
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sequences of positive testing were "arguably justified." '145
B. The National Labor Relations Act
The National Labor Relations Board recently found that an em-
ployer's requirement of drug and alcohol testing for employees who
require medical treatment for work injuries was a mandatory subject of
bargaining under Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations
Act. 146 In Johnson-Bateman Co.,147 an employer posted a notice, with-
out notifying or bargaining with the Union, informing employees that a
drug and alcohol test would accompany medical treatment for work-
related injuries.148 Despite objections from the employee's labor union,
the employer implemented its program.1 49
Applying the standard of Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB,15 ° the Board
decided that the testing requirement was "germane to the working en-
vironment" 15 1 and "outside the scope of managerial decisions, which
lie at the core of entrepreneurial control." '152 In finding that the policy
had a nexus with the company's work environment, the Board analo-
gized Johnson-Bateman's policy to physical examinations and poly-
graph testing, both mandatory subjects of bargaining.153 The Board
145. Id. at 2488-89. The Court cited Skinner v. Railway Labor Execs, 109 S. Ct.
1402 (1989), to illustrate that a railroad has a right to discharge a worker for one posi-
tive drug test, a right which Conrail did not assert. Consolidated Rail, 109 S. Ct. at
2486. For further discussion of Skinner, see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court subsequently vacated and remanded a case holding that the use
of dogs trained to smell drugs in searches constitutes a major dispute. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 838 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1988),
vacated, 109 S. Ct. 3207 (1989). The employees argued that drug testing was not a
mandatory subject of bargaining and, therefore, such disputes are not labor disputes at
all. 838 F.2d at 1089-90.
146. Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. No. 26 (Jun. 15, 1989). Sections 8(a)(5)
and 8(b)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, in conjunction with § 8(d), mandate
employers and bargaining representatives to bargain in good faith with each other about
wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982).
147. 295 N.L.R.B. No. 26.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. 441 U.S. 488 (1979). In Ford Motor, the Court found that in-plant food and
beverage prices were subject to mandatory collective bargaining. Id. at 495.
151. Johnson-Bateman, 295 N.L.R.B. No. 26. See also Ford Motor, 441 U.S. at 498
(terms and conditions under which food is available to employees is germane to the
working environment).
152. Johnson-Bateman, 295 N.L.R.B. No. 26.
153. Id. The Board relied upon its decision in Medicenter Midsouth Hospital, 221
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also found that, like polygraph testing, drug testing was not a decision
involving investments. Rather it was a change in the character of the
workplace so that it could not be considered an entrepreneurial deci-
sion.154 Therefore, bargaining over the testing was mandatory.155
C. Labor Arbitration Issues
When an employer requires drug testing or disciplines an employee
for a positive test result or a refusal to submit to testing, a labor union
may file a grievance on the employee's behalf. 56 Most collective bar-
gaining agreements call for arbitration; arbitrators must interpret these
agreements to decide if the testing scheme or the disciplinary action is
proper. 157
1. Implementation of procedures for drug screening
In Dow Chemical Co., 158 an arbitrator decided that a random drug
testing program was permissible at a petrochemical plant.159 In Dow,
an employer expanded an existing substance abuse policy to permit
random drug testing of employees at all levels. 6 The grievance con-
tended that the testing policy violated a provision of the parties' collec-
N.L.R.B. 670 (1975). In Medicenter, an employer violated the National Labor Rela-
tions Act when it unilaterally submitted all employees to polygraph tests in an attempt
to discover which employees were responsible for vandalism in the workplace. The
Board found that this was a change in "terms and conditions of employment," as it
varied both the "mode of investigation and character of proof" involved in the em-
ployer's search for a culprit, factors affecting the job security of all employees. Id. at
675.
Because of the disciplinary consequences of Johnson-Bateman's program, the Board
found that the testing requirement was analogous to the Medicenter polygraph testing.
The Board noted that the technology used in drug testing was a change in investigation
and proof strategies similar to the aberrations in the Medicenter investigating tech-
niques. Thus, the Board concluded that the testing requirement was germane to the
workplace environment. Johnson-Bateman, 295 N.L.R.B. No. 26.
154. Johnson-Bateman, 295 N.L.R.B. No. 26.
155. Id. Additionally, the Board failed to find a waiver of the Union's right to bar-
gain and declared that the parties' contract could not be interpreted to permit the em-
ployer's unilateral implementation of a testing program. Id.
156. H16bert, supra note 69, at 855.
157. Id. at 855-56.
158. 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1385 (1989) (Baroni, Arb.).
159. Id. at 1391.
160. Id. at 1385-86. The employer first issued the policy in 1984. On August 19,
1986, the company revised the policy to permit testing when the employer had probable
cause to suspect that an employee used drugs. Subsequently, Dow expanded the policy
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tive bargaining agreement which forbade employer's use of medical
examination to be used to "affect adverse discrimination" against a
worker.161 The arbitrator concluded that the agreement prohibited dif-
ferential treatment of employees on the basis of the same medical re-
strictions but did not prohibit discipline based on positive test
results. 162 Furthermore, random testing did not by itself discriminate
against workers. 16
3
In assessing the reasonableness of the company's random testing
program, the arbitrator in Dow considered the nature of the industry
and work environment and evidence of an extensive existing drug prob-
lem. 1 " The arbitrator concluded that a petroleum plant is a hazardous
place to work1 6' and that a serious drug problem existed at the plant
that testing only upon suspicion of drug use could not alleviate.
1 66
Therefore, the arbitrator upheld the company's random testing
scheme. 167
to permit random testing first, of top-level management; and, within a few months, of
union-hourly workers. Id.




165. Id. The arbitrator noted the presence of toxic chemicals and the seriousness of
a recent explosion.
166. Id. at 1389-90. An undercover investigation unveiled some drug users and
others came forward for an employee assistance program. Nearly 30 percent of employ-
ees in one part of the plant tested positive for or admitted to drug use. Id. Further, an
expert witness testified that effects of drug use are not always readily discernible. There-
fore, supervisors are unable to refer impaired employees to "for-cause" testing pro-
grams. Id.
167. Id. at 1390. The decision also upheld the company's testing process. The arbi-
trator found that the testing process itself was accurate and sufficiently uniform as to all
workers. Moreover, the workers proffered no evidence of excessive discretion in choos-
ing test subjects. Finally, the need for effective testing outweighed any intrusions on
employee privacy. Id. at 1391.
For additional decisions on testing programs, see Hopeman Brothers, Inc., 88 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 373 (1986) (Rothschild, Arb.) (upheld testing program noting protections
for employees and employees' opportunity to combat abuses through grievance proce-
dure). But see Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1001 (1987) (Heinsz,
Arb.) (program unreasonable because testing invades privacy and does not measure on-
the-job impairment). For discussion of Hopeman and Day, see HWbert, supra note 69, at
856-59.
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2. Discipline for Positive Test Results
In Boone Energy,"6 an arbitrator found that a company was justified
in instituting a substance abuse program after a clerical employee re-
ported to work while under the influence of a controlled substance.169
The arbitrator concluded that the company had a right to conduct a
nondiscriminatory search of employees and that employees' written
consent permitted the company to obtain and analyze blood and urine
samples.170 Despite this finding, the arbitrator refused to discharge
grievants for positive test results17 1 because the company offered no
evidence that the discharged individuals ever exhibited signs of on-the-
job impairment.172 The decision reflected a belief that body fluid test-
ing only demonstrates past exposure to drugs and not necessarily on-
the-job use or impairment. 7 '
The arbitrator in Roadway Express174 found that, under the parties'
collective bargaining agreement, the presence of marijuana in urine was
sufficient to establish that a worker was under the influence of drugs.1 75
When the grievant, a truck driver, showed signs of impairment, the
168. 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 233 (1985) (O'Connell, Arb.).
169. Id. at 236.
170. Id. The company informed employees that they did not have to undergo a
search or produce body fluid samples. However, the company advised employees that a
failure to cooperate would require the company to conclude that they were using con-
trolled substances. Hence, the company placed a burden on employees to prove other-
wise. Id. at 234. The decision also found that the company employed reasonable chain-
of-custody and labeling procedures. Id. at 237.
171. Id.
172. Id. See Zeese, supra note 44, at § 4.02[l][c], 4-22 to 4-23 (discussing the Boone
case and other arbitration decisions involving urine testing).
173. 85 Lab. Arb. at 237. See Zeese, supra note 44, at § 4.02[1][c]. Other decisions
reached similar results. See, eg., Chase Bag Co., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 441 (1986)
(Strasshofer, Arb.) (employer improperly fired workers for reporting to job under the
influence when test results were based solely on urine tests that did not reliably establish
blood alcohol content at time each grievant came to work, arbitrator noted that the
workers showed no sign of intoxication or impairment of work-related functions); Trail-
ways, Inc., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1073 (1987) (Goodman, Arb.) (noting no connection
between THC, a marijuana by-product, in the system and ability to work safely and
efficiently); Union Oil Co., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 91 (1986) (Weiss, Arb.) ("under the
influence" implied impairment); Georgia Pacific Corp., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 411 (1985)
(Clarke, Arb.) (tests do not conclusively establish that an employee is under the influ-
ence of drugs).
174. 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 224 (Cooper, Arb.).
175. Id. at 230-31.
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company tested him for drugs and alcohol. 76 The company fired the
driver after he tested positive for marijuana."' The arbitrator upheld
the discharge on the basis of the result, despite the Union's contention
that the company failed to present additional proof of impairment.178
3. Discipline for refusal to submit to test
Arbitrators have held that the refusal to submit to a drug test is
insubordination constituting grounds for discharge.1 9 In Jim Walter
Resources,"a two employees failed to provide duly requested urine
samples. 81 They contended that they were suffering from "bashful
kidney syndrome""8 2 notwithstanding management's furnishing of a
variety of drinks for assistance. The arbitrator, noting the workers'
ability to give samples to physicians the next day, upheld the com-
pany's decision to discharge the workers for insubordination.
18 3
176. Id. at 227-28.
177. Id. at 228.
178. Id. at 230-31. See also Amoco Oil Co., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1010 (1987) (Wei-
senberger, Arb.) (did not decide whether employer must present evidence of impair-
ment). For additional decisions upholding discharge for positive drug test results, see
B.F. Shaw Co., 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 497 (1988) (Talarico, Arb.) (revoked conditional
employment on basis of positive test); NPL Corp., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1031 (1987)
(Tripp, Arb.) (test results showed that employee had taken PCP shortly before adminis-
tration of the test); Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 82 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 150 (1983) (Bernhardt, Arb.) (test after bus accident). For further analysis of
these and other decisions upholding discharge, see ZEESE, supra note 44, at § 4.02[l][c];
H&bert, supra note 69, at 864-66.
179. ZEESE, supra note 44, at § 4.02[l][c], 4-23, citing Albert Einstein Medical
Center, 303 Summary Lab. Arb. Awards (AAA) No. 7 (1983) and Shell Oil Co., 81
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1205 (1983) (Brisco, Arb.). Sometimes such a ruling depends on
whether an employee has received notice that refusal amounts to insubordination. Sig-
nal Delivery Services, Inc., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 75 (1985) (Wies, Arb.); see ZEEsE,
supra note 44 at § 4.02[l][c], 4-23 through 4-24.
180. 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1254 (1987) (Nicholas, Arb.).
181. Id. at 1255. The arbitrator found that the company had a right to direct that
the workers deliver the specimens. Id.
182. Id. The arbitrator described the employees' position as a "temporary emotional
disorder." Id.
183. Id. at 1256. The samples were negative. Id. at 1255. Other decisions have
upheld discharge decisions in drug testing refusal disputes. See, eg., Concrete Pipe
Products Co., 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 601 (1986) (Caraway, Arb.) (discharge for refusal to
sign form acknowledging awareness of company's testing policy following written warn-
ings for refusal to submit to test after on-the-job injury); American Standard, 77 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 1085 (1981) (Katz, Arb.) (discharge for refusal to submit to test after being
advised of consequences of refusal). For further discussion of these cases, see H6bert,
supra note 69, at 860-61.
1990]
Washington University Open Scholarship
364 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 38:337
V. ANALYSIS
As previously noted, the most significant difference between public
sector and private sector drug testing is the availability to public em-
ployees of constitutional challenges.184 With few exceptions,' 85 only
government action is required to invoke the Bill of Rights or similar
state provisions. Criticism of this premise is usually based on a theory
of government acting as employer instead of as sovereign.'8 6 This
strongly resembles the governmental-proprietary distinction in sover-
eign immunity doctrine, a theory fraught with ambiguity and lacking
ease of application.
A closer look at drug testing cases, however, reveals a similarity of
reasoning between public and private sector decisions that transcends
the labels of the causes of actions available to employees. For example,
fourth amendment search and seizure claims and invasion of privacy
tort claims both turn on reasonableness.' 87 In Jackson v. Liquid Car-
bonic, '88 the court employed a balancing test identical to the formula
employed in search and seizure cases to analyze a privacy claim by a
private sector worker under a state statute.18 9 Private sector emotional
distress claims involve an element of outrage. " Similarly, a court
must find a shocking violation of standards of decency for a substantive
due process violation.' 91 Due process plaintiffs have also alleged publi-
184. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. Private tort actions tend to be
grounded in state law. This results in less uniformity of outcomes nationwide than in
constitutional cases unless a state statute governs private sector testing procedures.
Further, private, at-will employees do not enjoy the same procedural protections as
public sector workers which is a function of the constitutional dimension of public sec-
tor actions.
185. See, e.g., the California constitutional privacy clause. See supra note 53 for
text of the provision.
186. See Lowom v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988) (Guy, J.,
dissenting) (testing program of city in employer capacity should be judged in the same
manner as a program in the private sector). The government as employer theory was
rejected in O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
187. For analysis of fourth amendment claims, see supra notes 4-15 and accompa-
nying text. See supra notes 57-69 and accompanying text for analysis of tort claims
involving invasion of privacy.
188. 863 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1988).
189. Id. at 118. For further discussion of Jackson, see supra notes 64-68 and ac-
companying text.
190. See supra note 74 for discussion of this element of the tort claim in the Sat-
terfield decision.
191. See supra note 50 for discussion of this aspect of due process.
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cation of private facts1 9 2 in complaints reminiscent of invasion of pri-
vacy' 93 and defamation 194 actions. State statutes may regulate private
sector testing;195 public agencies promulgate testing procedures.
196
Handicap discrimination statutes may apply to public and private em-
ployers.' 97 Arbitration and collective bargaining play roles in both ar-
eas of employment.' 9 8 For example, an arbitrator's analysis of the
reasonableness of a private company's testing program involves a bal-
ancing test simila r to the one applied in search and seizure cases.1 99
Regardless of similarities and differences in actions challenging drug
testing schemes, workers and employers in both the private and public
sectors share common concerns. Employees of all types have an inter-
est in privacy and job security while employers are concerned about
profit and the safety of the workplace. Drug testing can make good
business sense for both labor and management. Regardless of its ad-
missibility in court,2 "° evidence that accidents decrease when compa-
192. See supra note 50 for discussion of due process actions based on a press release.
193. See supra notes 77-94 for discussion of the "disclosure" type of privacy action.
194. See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text for an example of acts constitut-
ing publication.
195. See supra notes 124-34 and accompanying text for an analysis of these statutes.
196. See supra note 23.
197. See supra notes 111-23 for discussion of handing discriminatory statutes.
198. For discussion of the labor law aspects of drug testing, see supra notes 135-84
and accompanying text.
199. Both balance employer interests and worker privacy interests. See supra note
37 and accompanying text for description of the test in fourth amendment actions. See
supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text for an arbitrator's finding that an employer
interest in eradicating a burgeoning drug problem outweighed intrusions on employee
rights because of safeguards within the testing program designed to protect employees.
City of Pomona, 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 457 (1988) (Rule, Arb.), agrees with the prem-
ise that arbitrators may make similar decisions in public and private sector disputes. In
City of Pomona, the arbitrator refused to terminate an employee despite his insubordi-
nation in refusing a test. 90 Lab. Arb. at 459. The arbitrator's finding that the city
should have obtained a warrant in order to test the officer could be analogized to a
finding of lack of reasonableness in the private sector. The decision noted that an ab-
sence of individualized suspicion contributed to this result as did the absence of the
officer from his beat due to temporary suspension. Id. at 459. The same logic could
apply to a dispute in which a private sector employee refused to submit to a random
drug testing scheme which was not sufficiently bolstered by employer interest in a drug-
free workplace. This interest could be lacking if the company presented no evidence of
an existing problem or of practical problems associated with drug use. Hence, an arbi-
trator may reinstate a private employee dismissed for refusal to submit to a test on the
grounds that the testing scheme was unreasonable.
200. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. This part of the article discussed
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nies eliminate drug users from safety-sensitive positions will encourage
employers to institute testing programs. Workers, too, clearly have an
interest in job safety. Workers' safety interests may override those of
management because lower-level employees are more often present at
accident sites.
Testing schemes can respect a worker's privacy interest. If followed
strictly and in good faith, the provisions of statutes20 1 and the direc-
tives of the Supreme Court2 0 2 provide adequate protection of workers'
interests, especially the interest in privacy when employers take sam-
ples. 20 3 Lower courts and legislators must strive to ensure that those
private employers directed neither by the fourth amendment nor a lo-
cal enactment are accountable to workers.
It is true that urine specimens can indicate an employee's medical
condition apart from his or her drug use. However, our legal system
affords protection to persons discriminated against because of preg-
nancy or medical problems.2" This protection provides sufficient
checks on improper use of samples.
Limiting testing to certain employees whose jobs implicate safety
concerns2 05 can prevent unnecessary intrusion upon employees' rights
without sacrificing a company's safety interest. The tests, however,
should not be limited to visibly impaired workers. Evidence exists
that, at least in some contexts, such limits on testing render programs
ineffective.2 " Further, requiring on-the-job impairment or drug use
before allowing a drug test is inconsistent with recent policy advocating
Kelley v. Schlumberger Technology Corporation, 849 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1988), in which
the First Circuit refused to admit evidence of a decrease in injuries at a workplace after
the implementation of a drug testing program.
201. See supra notes 124-34 and accompanying text for discussion of state statutes
regulating testing.
202. See, eg., Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1418 (1989)
(testing procedure did not require monitoring the production of samples).
203. See supra note 202.
204. Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(K) (1981). Handicap discrimination statutes cover many kinds of physical dis-
abilities. See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
205. The Supreme Court in Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402
(1989), allowed random testing of workers in sensitive positions. "Critical position"
requirements appear in state statutes. See ag., IOWA CODE ANN. § 730.5(3) (b).
206. See, e.g., Dow Chemical Co., 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1385 (1989) (Baroni, Arb.),
in which an arbitrator agreed that testing only on individualized suspicion of drug use




discipline or rehabilitation of casual users of illicit drugs. 207
VI. CONCLUSION
The calculus of drug testing decisions is essentially a balancing of the
interests of workers' and employers' concerns. In light of the United
States' national war on drugs, the scales may tip in favor of the inter-
ests of employers. Consequently, more decisions upholding drug test-
ing schemes should result. If employers conduct the battle against this
threat to workplace safety with an eye toward employee dignity and
privacy, perhaps the result will be a safer working environment in both
public and private places of employment.
Ellen Hoelscher*
207. President Bush echoed this policy in his September address. N.Y. Times,
supra note 1, at A1, col. 6 and B7, col. 6. For further discussion of Bush's speech, see
supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
* J.D. 1990, Washington University
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